Configurations the stylus of the kymograph, moved closer to one another); at the same time, they were ready to undergo mutations, breaking with each other and replacing one another (e.g., water motors being replaced by electric motors).
The role of machines in experimental physiology has often been studied by historians of the biological and biomedical sciences. 1 As is well known, the advent of the kymograph, one of the central instruments of laboratory physiology, was connected to the emergence and development of the steam engine. More recent studies have argued that electrophysiological procedures for precision time mea- surements relied on and further developed features of telegraph technology. In addition, it has been shown that the actual functioning of physiological instruments in the laboratory required advanced technological infrastructures, involving central motive forces placed in the basement (steam engines, gas motors, etc.) as well as urban networks providing electricity and water. While these studies have contributed in important ways to our understanding of experimental physiology as embedded in a specific material culture, more general aspects of the relation between experiments and machines have been addressed in studies concerning the history of the physical sciences. Authors such as M. Norton Wise, Andrew Pickering, and Peter Galison have investigated machines as "mediators" connecting scientific projects to societal concerns and vice versa. They have directed our attention to the "field of machines" that constitute the "material performativity" of science. And they have taught us to look at the "experimental apparatuses" of specific disciplines as machines. (In his "technological reading" of Einstein's famous 1905 article, Galison even suggests conceiving of scientific theories as machines-"Theory-Machines," as he puts it.) 2 Yet these studies seldom spell out to what extent their respective notions of machines differ from commonsense ideas of technological objects. Explicit definitions of what a machine is or can do are rare. 3 References concerning the history of the machine concept and/or philosophical notions of the technological objects are often lacking. As a result, we sometimes seem to be thrown back on the modern, twofold vision of the machine: on the one side, the isolated, solid, greasy, and extremely powerful mechanism that transfers, by means of its movable parts (or in some other way), concentrated force; on the other side, the myth of the machine or the imaginary machine, the machine as a metaphor that exists more or less independently from its concrete form and function. 4 Against the
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modern image of the machine Galison and Pickering have stressed the materiality and connectedness of scientific instruments and other laboratory gear. In this connection, they have occasionally made reference to Donna Haraway's influential "Cyborg Manifesto," such as when they emphasize the close connection between laboratory workers and reading machines in the field of microphysics, or, more generally, when they study the history of man-machine interactions after World War II. In both cases, the machine turns into a rather complex system, synthesizing technological as well as nontechnological, organic as well as nonorganic components.
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Inspired by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in the present paper I introduce a similarly complex, post-and/or premodern conception of the machine into the historical study of the experimental life sciences. I suggest conceiving of physiological experiments as machines in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari-that is, as time-based syntheses of diverse and distinct partial objects opening paths or passages from materiality to semiotics. In this perspective, physiological experiments are machines not simply because the historical focus is on instruments and technological systems; rather, they are machines because they combine technological components with parts of human and nonhuman organisms to form essentially precarious, but functioning, arrangements of flows and interruptions that are directed toward the production of semiotic events. I argue that this generalized notion of the machine allows us to investigate in detail the relation of matter, sign, and time that was (and still is) of crucial importance in the scientific practice of physiology and other experimental life sciences. 6 In Deleuze and Guattari, the concept of machine refers to local and temporary installations combining "really distinct" parts in order to create economic effects in the most general sense. 7 The examples they give in this regard are well known to readers of their works: Under the bureaucratic conditions of the great empires, stones, wood, ropes, and human beings were connected with each other to form the "mega-machine" of pyramid construction. In the steppe, man, horse, and bow combined with one another to result in a nomadic war machine. The modern factory system connects the "conscious organs" of the workers as well as the "unconscious organs" of the machinery with the central motive power. 8 In highly general terms, Deleuze and Guattari define "machine" as a "system of interruptions or breaks (coupures)," or as a "system that interrupts flows." 9 In their seminal Anti-Oedipus, this definition mainly refers to human organisms that control, in a more or less idiosyncratic manner, their relations to other human organisms and their surroundings by means of repeated closures of the body orifices (as is well known, the first volume of the work offers an extended critique concerning the psychoanalytic theory of object relations). 10 Evidently, Deleuze and Guattari's generalized machine concept refers to technological objects as well-or more precisely, to the temporal connections and dynamic interactions between organisms and machines. As does Haraway, Deleuze and Guattari strive for a "transversal" perspective on the relations between technology and the body:
The object is no longer to compare man and the machine in order to evaluate the correspondences, the extensions, the possible or impossible substitutions of one for the other, but to bring them into communication to show how man is a component part of the machine, or combines with something else to constitute a machine. The other thing can be a tool, or even an animal, or other men.
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It is in this sense that the experimental set-ups assembled and used by nineteenth-century physiologists and psychologists can be conceived of as machines. In fact, there seems to be hardly any other realm of experimental research that was as constantly driven to turn tools, animals, and human beings into "component parts" of machines in order to create epistemic (and sometimes even aesthetic) effects.
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In what follows I relate this notion of "machine" to a concrete example taken from the history of nineteenth-century physiology. Based on published and unpublished sources, I will reconstruct the machinic installations that the Dutch physiologist Franciscus Cornelis Donders (1818-1889) designed and used for conducting his experiments concerning the question of physiological time in human beings from the mid-1860s to the early 1870s. I will show that conceiving of experiments as machines in a nonmodern sense contributes significantly to our historical understanding of the material and semiotic cultures of science. Adopting this perspective, we can continue to understand experimental set-ups as "inscription devices"-or, more precisely, as material networks that participate in as well as contribute to the production and circulation of signs in scientific practice, in a manner similar to what Bruno Latour has suggested in his study of soil sampling in the Amazon forest. 13 At the same time, we are enabled to extend this predominantly spatial view of science with respect to the problem of time. The "Donders machine" as it will be described and investigated in this paper was based on a dynamic meshing of flows of materiality and semiotic stuff; that is, a precisely timed and tuned coordination of interfaces between mechanic, organic, energetic, and semiotic aspects. In this machine, the chain from matter to signs, or, to speak with Guattari, from presignifying to signifying semiologies, 14 was organized through a temporal chaining of quite diverse partial objects-a chaining that punctuated and marked time and thus synchronized processes rooted in technology and/or the body in highly specific ways. In this context, time does not simply equal "duration" or "change": what is at stake here is time as the milieu intérieur of machines.
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The Donders machine served to measure physiological time experimentally. It consisted of a series of experimental set-ups assembled and used by Franciscus Donders in his Utrecht laboratory from the summer of 1865 to the winter of 1872. Initially, Donders's scientific work focused on histology and ophthalmology. In 1862, he became director of the Physiological Institute at Utrecht. There, his research mainly concerned the field of physiological optics, the physiology of respiration and digestion, and the physiology of speech and the voice. As the author of more than 340 scientific publications (among them an important handbook on human physiology), as a polyglot correspondent sharing vital exchanges with many of his colleagues (including Hermann von Helmholtz, Jacob Moleschott, Albrecht von Graefe, Ernst Brücke, and Étienne Jules Marey), and as an innovative laboratory director, Donders counts as one of the most significant figures of nineteenth-century physiology. 16 In the history of the experimental life sciences, his research on physiological time has a peculiar status, however. On the one hand, the importance of these investigations, carried out partly in cooperation with his doctoral student, Johan Jacob de Jaager, can be compared to the pioneering experiments on the speed of nervous conduction carried out by Helmholtz in the late 1840s. By introducing the procedure of "choice reactions" and the "subtracting method," Donders indeed contributed importantly to the emergence of a laboratory-based investigation of psychological phenomena: it is no wonder, then, that historians of psychology celebrate the year 1865, the publication date of de Jaager's thesis and a corresponding communication by Donders, as the birth year of experimental psychology and the cognitive sciences. 17 On the other hand, Donders's research on physiological time occupies a relatively marginal position in his scientific work overall: he published only one article on the topic, i.e. his study "On the Speed of Psychological Processes" published in Dutch, French, and German in 1868. 18 He did seem to be interested in a more extended investigation of the subject, however; evidence for this is provided by the published article as well as by his manuscripts, which contain sketches for a book-length study, The will always make reference first to the English translation ("Speed") and second to the German text ("Schnelligkeit"). In many instances, I have modified the English translation; all other translations from Donders's texts and others are by myself, unless otherwise stated.
Speed of Activities in the Nervous
Systems: Contribution to a Physiology of the Soul-a project that was never completed.
The emergence of the Donders machine refers back to Hermann von Helmholtz's experiments concerning the propagation speed of nervous impulses in human beings. As will be shown in this paper, Donders's initial goal was to repeat Helmholtz's experiments-a project that had been tackled before him by scholars such as Adolphe Hirsch and Rudolph Schelske. 19 The results of this research were inconclusive, however. Whereas Helmholtz had given for the propagation of excitations in the sensory nerves of human beings an average result of 60 meters per second, Hirsch and Schelske came up with approximately 30 meters per second. In his studies with de Jaager, Donders measured 26 meters per second. It was only in the 1870s that Helmholtz was able to explain the differences in these results by making reference to striking differences in room and body temperature. 20 Moreover, Donders not only tried to measure the "physiological time" that was consumed in the peripheral nerves of human beings, he was also interested in the time required centrally (i.e., by the brain) when a reaction to a stimulus was provoked-a question that Helmholtz had treated only in passing. The basic principle of the machine that Donders and de Jaager used for measuring the physiological time of these central processes was as simple as it was effective: First, they measured the time an experimental subject took to react to repeated uniform stimuli; then they determined the time the same subject took to react to a specific stimulus when confronted with various stimuli in a row. Based on the difference between the results of the two series of experiments, they deduced the psychological time needed to identify a specific stimulus or, as Donders put it, to "decide upon a dilemma." Thus, a basic psychological function, the making of distinctions, seemed to have been measured for the first time.
The present paper is organized according to an analytic scheme that I think should be useful, for further investigations into the his-tory of experiment. In the first part, I describe Donders's precarious but functional experimental installations with respect to the more or less transitory couplings that, in the course of his work, were created between the distinct parts of these installations. As will become clear, the corresponding couplings between bodies, instruments, and paper were altered over time: new component parts (such as the "phonautograph" and the tuning fork) were introduced into the machine, and others (e.g., the kymograph and the metronome) were dismissed. After this descriptive section, I will isolate the functional scheme or diagram that the Donders machine organized. 21 Put simply, it consisted in measuring physiological time by recording acoustic curves. This scheme led to a practical deterritorialization of the body, transforming it by means of experiment into a surface; at the same time, it allowed a theoretical reterritorialization of the body by means of anatomical and physiological concepts.
In the remainder of the paper, my machine analysis is pushed further into two directions: toward the core, and toward the periphery of the machine. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the core elements of machines are "bound together by the absence of any tie." 22 As core components of the Donders machine, I isolate a wild boar bristle, a swan feather, a tuning fork, and a brass drum. I argue that there is no natural, logical, or signifying connection between these organic and nonorganic parts: their combination according to principles of precise time experiments shows in an exemplary manner the "together with" and "against each other" of the natural and the artificial that is highly characteristic of the experimental life sciences. Finally, the periphery of the Donders machine mainly concerns the semiotic outcome of its functioning. Machine-produced and/or handwritten signs connected Donders's laboratory bench with his writing desk, his data sheets and manuscripts with his publications, and even professional aspects of his life with private ones. This periphery certainly extends beyond the machine, but is similarly heterogeneous and connected. It cannot "explain" the emergence of the Donders machine, but once it had crystallized and begun to develop, this periphery exerted some sort of selective pressure on the machine. As I will show, the pressure manifested itself for Donders as a disproportion between the increased possibilities of technology-based sign production in the laboratory and his personal capacities for the processing of signs and their manual production at the desk. Here again, issues of temporality enter into the picture: Donders, the time physiologist, simply did not find the time to publish more than one article concerning the question of physiological time.
Couplings
In a trivial sense, the Donders machine was not a bachelor machine:
23 at least one point, the physiologist's wife intervened directly in its construction. Ernestina Donders apparently was a person as musically gifted as she was cultivated from a language point of view. As Moleschott noted, she possessed "a pleasant voice and more so an educated one," as well as "musical certainty and poetical reason." 24 Perhaps it was her predilection for Carl Löwe's ballads and lieder-"Ich trage, wo ich gehe, stets eine Uhr bei mir"-that rendered her particularly attentive to the relations between sound, signs, and time, or perhaps her husband simply kept her informed as to the difficulties he encountered in his laboratory work. In any case, in early February 1858 Ernestina Donders made a discovery that would leave a clear mark in the history of science. Franciscus was excited and immediately set out to write to his friend and colleague Helmholtz:
To the literature of my wife belongs the Illustration. . . . In this last issue she has found a communication that caught her attention, and she hurried to direct mine to it. It concerns nothing less than the graphical representation of sound curves. Since I have not found anything else elsewhere, the matter may be of interest to you. 25 Donders underscored that the journal report was riddled with exaggerated expectations and gave few technical details; contrary to what the title of the journal suggested, it did not even contain a drawing of the device in question. One thing was certain, however: its inventor, a certain Édouard Scott, had succeeded in graphically recording sounds and noises. Even more, his "phonautograph" (i.e., "sound self-writer") registered presignifying signs displaying remarkable differences between the human voice and musical instru- ments. 26 Apparently, Scott's sound self-writer was even capable of representing single aspects of human speech, such as volume, pitch, and timbre. And since Donders knew that Helmholtz was busily working on his handbook on physiological acoustics, the Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, he was straightforward: "It seems to me that in your hands, the method would lead to marvels." 27 Helmholtz, however, was not really interested in using the phonautograph in his physiological laboratory. When the Tonempfindungen were published in 1863, readers found only a "copy of a drawing" showing some phonautograph curves. Moreover, these curves were not produced by female or male voices, but by vibrations of a tuning fork and the beats occurring between the sound of two organ pipes. 28 In other words, Helmholtz had not used the phonautograph for investigating speech or vocal music; Donders, in contrast, did not hesitate. When the Parisian instrument maker Rudolph Koenig presented the "Phonautograph according to Scott" as an exclusive product in 1859, Donders immediately ordered the instrument. Koenig claimed that the phonautograph allowed all learned individuals "to carry out a vast number of scientific investigations that until now had remained absolutely impossible" 29 -and at least for a certain period of time, this sentence was turned into a reality in the Utrecht laboratory. Once received and put to work, Koenig's device functioned in Donders's laboratory as an attractor for innovative machinic practices concerning first the physiology of speech, and then the time relations in the human brain and nervous system.
In the summer of 1865, everything was set. Donders describes the decisive experimental situation as soberly as one might expect from a scientific author: "August 21, 7 P.M., Messrs Hamer and Donders in front of the phonautograph. H shouts, D answers. Tuning fork = 261 vibrations." 30 A first series of experiments ran as follows: H (i.e., Hamer) shouted "ki," D (Donders) answered "ki." This was repeated more than twenty times. The resulting effects were fixed and calculated. Between the two "kis" the scientists measured an average of 51.5 vibrations of a tuning fork that made 261 vibrations per second; in other words, the Donders machine made the physiologist take an average of 0.197 seconds to react (see Fig. 2 ).
A second series of experiments was carried out. Now, Hamer emitted different kinds of verbal stimuli, without preparing Donders for what to expect: "ki," but also "ka," "ko," and "ke," in an order as arbitrary as possible. Donders was asked to respond to these stimuli by shouting them again. In this experiment, the average number of tuning-fork vibrations was 74.33, equal to 0.285 seconds. In a third and final series of experiments, Hamer again shouted "ki," "ka," "ko," etc. in an order as arbitrary as possible-but this time, Donders was asked to react only when he heard "ki" and to indicate this by repeating "ki" as quickly as he could. The result was 63.34 vibrations, or 0.243 seconds.
By comparing these results, Donders was able to isolate single elements of the reaction process. When he subtracted the results of the first series (simple repetition of "ki") from the results of the third series of machine effects (selective reaction to "ki") he arrived at the time needed for recognizing "ki," or, as he put it, for stating the identity of "impression and representation"; in the given case, this time span amounted to 0.046 seconds. When he subtracted the results of the first series of machine effects (simple repetition of "ki") from the results of the second series (repetitions of "ki," "ka," "ke," etc.), he found the time that was required in order to identify the respective stimuli and to react accordingly. In this case, in addition to developing the appropriate representation, or idea, of the stimulus, there was a factor at stake that Donders called the "differential determination of the will," or "decision making." In temporal terms, this process needed 0.088 seconds, clearly more than for the simple identification of "ki." By means of temporal measurements, Donders could thus separate precisely the "determination of the will" from the "development of a representation": the latter required 0.046 seconds, the former 0.042. In other words, Donders's machine did not just provide time measurements (Zeitmessungen), but functioned also like a sort of temporal knife (Messer) cutting psychological processes into well-defined pieces.
There is no doubt that the phonautograph was a central component of the Donders machine. By means of this device, experimenter and experimental subject were joined, and together they transformed shouted, perhaps even sung, fragments of language into presignifying signs of time. In his article "On the Speed of Psychological Processes," Donders depicted this both material and semiotic process as "noematachography"-that is, the writing of the speed of thought. His contemporary, the philosopher John Stuart Mill, would have characterized this approach as mental chemistry: the decomposition of complex psychological processes into their basic elements. 31 As a matter of fact, Donders was interested in average results and in minimum results, "minima": he was looking for reactions that were as fast as possible, and this implied reducing as much as possible the inertia and potential errors of his machine, so that the basic elements of complex voluntary and ideational processes would be separated from one another with sufficient sharpness.
However, the installation with phonautograph was not the only and not the first experimental set-up used in the Utrecht laboratory for analyzing physiological and psychological processes; only a few weeks earlier, in April and May 1865, Donders had used an installation with a conventional kymograph for the same purpose (see Fig. 3 ).
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In this version of the Donders machine, the experimental subject sat at a table upon which an induction coil and several switches were placed. An electrode was fixed to one of the subject's feet, on the skin above the ankle bone. The task for the experimental subject was to react, by operating one of the switches, to the sensation of a light electric shock triggered by the experimenter. To record the time, a metronome was used. More than one hundred times per minute, the metronome closed a circuit and thus controlled, by means of electromagnetism, a needle inscribing precise zigzag lines on a rotating kymograph drum. Simultaneously, the reactions of the experimental subject were recorded on the drum. Once the recordings were made, precise determinations of time were accomplished using a magnifying glass to check and compare the two curves exactly.
After the foot experiments, Donders and de Jaager used their kymograph installation for conducting a second series of experiments. Now, the electrode was placed somewhere on the skin of the inguinal region of the experimental subject. Again, the subject was asked to react to light electric shocks by operating a switch; again, the metronome was ticking, and the needles were scratching, producing signs. Body states of intensity were translated into an abstract axiomatic. Physiological time was measured. Then, the results of the two experiments were compared: foot vs. groin. Did not the only difference between the two series consist in the place where the electrode was fixed? As the physiologists reasoned, it was possible to deduce the speed of the propagation of excitations in the nerve from differences in time. In this way, the first version of the Donders machine led Donders and de Jaager to the result that differed so strikingly from Helmholtz's earlier experiments: they measured 26 meters per second, not 60, for the speed of propagation.
Once set into motion, the kymograph installation invited further experimentation. Connected by electrodes and switches to kymo-graph and metronome, the human body seemed to offer itself for an almost infinite number of experimental variations. Not its organs, but only its surface was of interest. For example, both feet of the experimental subject were connected to electrodes, while the subject's hands were lying in front of two switches on the table. An intensity created in the left foot should now be "answered" by reacting with the left hand, an intensity in the right foot by reacting with the right hand. Again, the metronome was ticking, needles were performing their (pre)signifying work on the rotating drum, physiological time was measured. Then the same again, but with eyes shut: this time, the experimental subject could not see which side of the body was being stimulated. As in Donders's later experiments with the phonautograph, he and de Jaager used the difference between the obtained results to deduce the precise time required for a psychological process. The development of a representation, or idea, and the determination of will needed an average of 1/15 second. The physiologist could hardly disguise his pride: for Donders, it was a fact that 226 Configurations Through the induction coils c and c' the current was led on one side to the Pohl seesaw (W) and the electrodes n and n'. On the other side it was conducted to the switch p and the needles at the kymograph. The seesaw was operated by the experimenter, the switch p by the experimental subject. At the kymograph, two needles were operated by means of electromagnetism. The left needle registered stimuli and reactions, the right one the ticking of the metronome (not on the drawing). For reasons of visibility, the two curves on the kymograph drum are represented as inscribed higher on the drum than they really were. "the first determination of the duration of a well-defined psychological process" had been accomplished.
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But there was more. The first version of the Donders machine was further transformed and extended. In addition to electric shocks, optical events might also serve as stimuli. Hence, Donders and de Jaager made use of a Dubosq lantern, which they equipped with a sort of shutter: by means of a lever, the light ray became visible and simultaneously, the measurement of time was started. Various kinds of reactions were possible: with the left hand, with the right hand. Again, there was ticking and scratching. For another series of experiments, Donders and de Jaager inserted colored glass plates, red and white; further reactions were required, first with the left, then with the right hand. Finally, the phonautograph was activated: wasn't this instrument able to register acoustic events exactly? And couldn't these events serve as stimuli and reactions? Donders and de Jaager's answer was clearly affirmative. In this way, they circumscribed the productive and receptive spectrum of the Donders machine. The stimuli the machine could emit ranged from the decoded flows of light and electricity to the signifying semiologies of language. The reactions it could record ranged from simple gestures of the hand to rudimentary utterances.
Donders and his doctoral student were well aware that the machine they had assembled was a precarious one. They were certainly able to use it for conducting a wide variety of experiments. The question was, however, how precise were the measurements? At one point in his thesis, de Jaager notes that "an absolute meaning could not be attributed" to the results he found; as he explained, in the installation with the kymograph one could never be sure whether or not the electromagnets moving the needles required as much time for the attraction as for the repulsion of the corresponding metal pieces. 34 In a similar vein, Donders stated in his article published in 1868 that the method he had developed together with de Jaager was "not exact enough to trust the difference between the minima." 35 In his handwritten notes, Donders frankly admitted that the de Jaager method was "full of handicaps": The kymograph's drum rotated far too slowly. In addition, its movements were so irregular that deciphering the traces was a permanent source of error. Above all, the installation with kymograph was flawed by an electromagnetic error, which could hardly be compensated for when measuring absolute In a further step, Donders discussed the recorded events, namely, the stimuli and reactions. In the work with de Jaager, the physiological time had proved to be quite variable: depending on the given stimuli and the required responses, the results differed considerably. The longest times were measured in motor reactions to color stimuli; in comparison, verbal reactions to verbal stimuli were much faster. Donders explained this difference by pointing to the fact that the experimental subject was either more or less familiar with the presented stimuli and the required responses: colored light, he argued, was a quite artificial stimulus; in comparison, speech seemed to be much more "natural." The phonautograph made it possible to perform the experiments in exactly this way: "ki," "ki." As Donders put it, in front of the sound self-writer, the subject under experimentation could rely on a "simple imitation" 37 of the speech stimulus, and precisely this brought Donders closer to the minima he was looking for. However, not all utterances were equally useful for time measurements by means of the phonautograph. Vowels were not recommended for this sort of voice-controlled chronometry: in vowels, Donders explained, the sound "is not generated suddenly enough to record the start precisely."
38 Only in connection with consonants, especially plosives and fricatives (such as k, t, or p), were vowels apt to pinpoint speech in the required way. In other words, the Donders machine could measure time only when glottis, palate, or lips had introduced interruptions or breaks into the stream of air coming out of the lungs of experimenter and experimental subject: only under this condition would the laboratory workers connect appropriately with the phonautograph. Ultimately, the semiotic work carried out by the Donders machine thus started in the throats of the human beings involved. And, as we shall see, it did not end on the rotating, sooted drum.
The Scheme
The Donders machine functioned against the background of an epistemology of analytic experimentation. As John Pickstone has shown, this form of experimental activity does not primarily aim at deciding between well-stated hypotheses; rather, it serves to elabo-rate principles for reconstructing complex phenomena from their basic elements. 39 Similar to a chemist, Donders set out to trace compound phenomena on the border between physiology and psychology (feeling, thought) to their simplest components (sensations, representations). In its various realizations the Donders machine achieved exactly that: it performed physio-and psychoanalyses. Though the machine followed principles similar to analytic procedures, its functioning clearly differed from the analytic procedures cultivated by organic chemists, pathological anatomists, and botanists during the first third of the nineteenth century. Neither balances nor microscopes were needed to set the Donders machine into motion; the elements it isolated were hardly as tangible as tissues or cells; there was no body that had to be opened and sectioned, no organs or members of the body that had to be cut out or off for preparation. What the Donders machine did instead was to cut out sequences from a flow of movements or behavior. Above all, the experimental subject had to sit still and-following half-technological, half-physiological orders-to react as swiftly as possible to stimuli of all sorts.
Once it functioned, the Donders machine produced bodily states of intensity. By means of decoded flows (electricity, light) and the use of fragments from signifying semiologies (syllables at first, but soon also single characters), it stimulated single points on the surface of the human body (parts of the skin, sense organs). According to a specific program, these states were transposed into motor actions: the movements of hands on switches, or the uttering of speech sounds. The result was a measuring of time, but also a farreaching deterritorialization of the organized body. In fact, the functioning of the Donders machine did not account for any concrete anatomy forming the basis for the production, propagation, and transformation of intensities. It was not concerned with the precise path a specific excitation took through the body. The main interest was in the time required for taking the path, for accomplishing the processes. And exactly this was the focus of the experiments in the Utrecht laboratory: first varying the stimuli, then varying the reactions, but also conducting extended series of trials. The latter was meant to improve the reliability of the measurements, while the variations served to detect differences-differences in time, not in space. The organic body intervened only as a flattened entity, an en-velope offering multiple points of access. Only the distances on this envelope contributed to the detection of time differences.
The deterritorialization of the body was intertwined with a reterritorializing practice of conceptual distinctions. Such distinctions served to allow the analysis of reactions or behavioral sequences that were circumscribed experimentally. Based on his anatomical and physiological knowledge, Donders began to reterritorialize the body that was connected to the machine. He named a total of twelve partial processes that he assumed to be occurring in the span between excitation and reaction-from the action of the stimulus "on the perceiving elements in the sensory organs," the conduction of the excitation through the "sensory nerves" to the ganglion cells of the medulla, and the "increase in activity of the nerve cells of the organ of will" (i.e., the brain), to the conduction of the excitation within the "movement nerves" toward the muscles that completed the required movement. The ideal of this conceptual analysis was completeness: empty spaces had to be avoided. But sharp distinctions could not be reached-as Donders had to concede, pure time measurements were not sufficient to distinguish all the components of the reaction process from one another: "The times required for the separate stages of the process cannot be determined"; only the propagation speed of the excitation in the nerves could "approximately" be taken into account. 40 In other words, the limits were soon reached in the anatomical and physiological reterritorialization of the body. A purely time-based analysis of all physiological processes involved was impossible. What instead seemed to be feasible was a "quantitative treatment" of a reaction process translated into psychological terms.
Donders assumed that "a complete knowledge of the functioning of the brain, with which each psychological process is connected," could not be gained in the near future; even if the knowledge about the cerebral and nervous basis of mental life was complete, the explanation of psychological phenomena would run into difficulties: "psychological activity" has, "in form and nature . . . a character completely of its own."
41 It could not be simply reduced to other "activities," such as cerebral or nervous processes. With this statement, Donders remained inside the epistemological framework of analytic experimentation. Mill, in his System of Logic, had argued for understanding the epistemological principle of reducing complex phenomena to their elements, but not in the sense of a universal procedure always oriented toward material or bodily substances; rather, he advocated regionally restricted analyses. Only in a second step should the results of such analyses be brought together with the results from other realms of analytic research. 42 It was in this sense that Donders engaged in psychological analysis. Differently put, the reterritorialization of the body stagnated along the way: instead of reaching the authentic anatomy and physiology of the body, the Donders machine instituted a bifurcation leading to the almost entirely autonomous territory of the psychological. Perhaps one should even say, the machine engendered this territory based on its own practice of intensities.
The basic scheme or "diagram" organizing the Donders machine was reminiscent of Helmholtz's investigations on the propagation speed of nervous excitations. In his pioneering time experiments with nerve-muscle preparations from the frog, Helmholtz had placed an electrode on different points of the nerve, thus allowing the propagation speed to be deduced from the differences in the elapsed times (see Fig. 4 ). He followed the same principle in his experiments with human beings: "At some limited point of skin . . . a very weak electric shock" was applied to the experimental subject, and the subject was asked to react to the sensation as quickly as he or she could by means of "a certain movement of the hand or the teeth." Then a different point of skin was chosen, again a light shock was given, reactions followed and were measured. From the difference in measurements between the big toe and the neck (or the finger and the throat), Helmholtz deduced the absolute speed of the propagation of excitation in the sensory nerves of human beings. 43 Just as for Donders, this deduction was based upon the assumption that the only difference between the various series of experiments consisted in the position of the electrodes on the surface of the body. All other parameters-the stimuli themselves, the functioning of the measuring instruments, the identity of the conduction speed in the sensory and the motor nerves, even the transposition of sensations into movements-were deemed by Helmholtz to be constant. When describing the time required for cerebral processes, for example, he explicitly underscored that "the duration of the processes of perSchmidgen / The Donders Machine 231 ceiving and willing in the brain does not depend upon the place on the skin at which the impression is made." 44 Otherwise, Helmholtz could only argue that, within single series of experiments, he had found a "sufficient agreement" of results. What remained constant, then, was nothing but the "sums" of the measured times. How these sums were constituted remained largely obscure.
The conceptual distinctions that Helmholtz suggested in order to break down the reaction process into its components were accordingly brief. In the few published lines he devoted to his experiments with human beings, he spoke simply of the "sending of the sig-44. Helmholtz, "On the Methods" (above, n. 43), p. 324.
nal"-that is, the propagation of the excitation in the sensory nerves, the processes of "perceiving and willing in the brain," and the transmission of the "message" through the motor nerves to the muscles. In his later, more extended investigations on the propagation speed of nervous excitations, he returned to working with nerve-muscle preparations from the frog. As is well known, he then also favored the graphical method. The reason for this was not just to improve the precision of time measurements, but also to improve the limited significance of pure time measurements. The initially adopted galvanometer method of Claude-Servais-Mathias Pouillet only allowed contractions and reactions to be translated into numerical values of time. In contrast, Helmholtz's newly constructed "myographion" offered the means to record the contraction of the frog muscle in its entirety, hence preparing it for further dissections (Zergliederungen). 45 Time measurements were "just" measurements; graphical recordings provided actual tracings of the phenomena in question.
In Donders's case, the relation between graphics and measurements was almost the reverse. Donders did not start with the measurement of time and then change to the graphical method; on the contrary, it was his interest in and familiarity with the graphical method that allowed him to use it for the purpose of measuring time. In 1859, in his text book Physiologie des Menschen, both aspects were still juxtaposed: on the one side, the sphygmograph for curvelike recordings of the movements of blood; on the other, the hemotachometer for determining the speed of blood movements. It was only when Donders engaged in an investigation concerning the rhythm of the heartbeats that he was led to move concretely from the graphical method to time measurements. The laboratory machine assembled on this occasion can easily be recognized as an early form of the installation with a kymograph that Donders (with de Jaager) would use shortly thereafter for his research on physiological time. The machine consisted of the beating heart of an experimental subject, a stethoscope held to the subject's breast, the listening ear of the physiologist, a hand operating a switch, an electromagnetic needle device recording every operation of the switch on a rotating kymograph drum, and a metronome that recorded its second beats on the same drum, also by means of elec-tromagnetism. With his hand, Donders imitated the rhythm of the heartbeats he could hear through the stethoscope in such a way that corresponding marks were drawn onto the kymograph drum: boombooom. Simultaneously, the metronome recorded every second beat: tick-tock. From the comparison between the curves produced by the imitated heart tone and the metronome, Donders concluded that the two different tones of the heart were separated by a time interval of 0.301 to 0.327 seconds. Then the question emerged whether or not this graphical measurement of time was reliable. What if the listener and imitator of the heartbeats committed errors? To answer this question, Donders reduced his machine: he no longer repeated the heartbeat of the experimental subject, but the ticking of the metronome. The comparison of the two curves showed some anomalies. As could be expected, the imitation of the ticking always implied a slight delay-but what Donders did not expect was that these delays were not regular, but differed: sometimes they were rather long, sometimes extremely short. The question became, was it the physiology or the psychology of the combined experimental subject and experimenter that manifested itself here? At this point, only one more step was needed to use the same kymograph-metronome installation for the investigation of the physiological time of psychological processes. 46 During the same period, Donders's interest in the physiology of speech led him from graphics to time measurements. In April 1858, he wrote an open letter to the Vienna-based physiologist Ernst Brücke. In his studies on the physiology and systematics of speech sounds, Brücke had introduced a rather clear-cut distinction between vowels and consonants: "In all consonants there is either a closure somewhere in the mouth channel . . . or a narrowness that provokes a clearly audible, autonomous noise which is independent from the sound of the voice"; in vowels, he claimed, nothing of this sort was the case. 47 As a consequence, vowels were conceived of by him as pure sounds, whereas consonants were mixtures of sounds and noises. In his letter, Donders argued against this clear-cut distinction between vowels and consonants. According to him, the experience of whispered speech, speech "without voice," made it evident that every vowel was accompanied by a characteristic noise. He had to concede, however, that currently there were no methods available for experimentally investigating these sounds. 48 As has been noted above, this state of affairs was about to change when the phonautograph was introduced as an instrument for automatic recordings of human speech.
In 1864, Donders presented the first results of his phonautographical studies on speech to the public. In a short note "On the Nature of Vowels," he reported how he had recorded the "oscillation forms" of speech and vocals as well as instrumental music by means of the newly purchased phonautograph. Having Brücke's distinction obviously still in the back of his mind, he was especially interested in the smooth transitions between vowels and consonants, and vice versa; thus he observed that "many consonants modify in a characteristic manner the beginning and the ending of the vowel curve." 49 In his later experiments on physiological time, he had recourse to this same observation: the syllable "ki" was an apt time marker because the fricative k modified the beginning of the curve of the following vowel in such a way that a starting point became clearly visible.
Donders's work with the phonautograph was not limited to the "nice and faithful" 50 recordings of human utterances (see Fig. 5 ): shortly later, he also began to measure these utterances-for example, the duration of the single vowels in diphthongs. In 1864, as he reported in another article, he phonautographically tackled the question of whether or not the vowel "a" in the Dutch word for day, daag, was longer than the same vowel in the plural form dagen: "The result of the investigation was that, pronouncing it by myself in the usual manner, the 'a' sound in daag needed 42 vibrations of 261 in a second. The same sound in dagen only needed 37." 51 The vibrations Donders referred to were of course the vibrations of a tuning fork connected to the phonautograph-just as in his later phonautographical experiments on physiological time. Thus, he had paved a second way from graphical recordings to time measurements: speech was not only traced, but also timed. In other words, the phonauto-
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graph was ready for its use within the framework of the Donders machine, which, until then, had relied on kymographs and metronomes. The Donders machine thus emerged from experimental setups for physiological investigations of speech and circulation that extended themselves into the machine, combined with each other, and became oriented by a novel scheme of analysis. The result was the remarkable compromise that the Donders machine materialized: it measured time by recording acoustic curves.
The Core
The phonautograph resembled the Donders machine in its entirety. Taken in itself, the sound self-writer was already a heterogeneous assemblage of organic and mechanic, natural and artificial components. The construction of this machine-within-the-machine relied on an implicit "organology," a general theory of tools no longer stressing the difference between "natural" and "artificial." 52 To physiologists such as Donders, the "similarity between developed organisms and artificial tools manufactured by human beings" was "not to be overlooked"; in the introduction to his physiology textbook, he wrote programmatically: "We hope to have made evident the mutual connections between the parts and the phenomena of the body . . . in the same way as in our artificial products (Kunstprodukten), and we transfer the terminology from the latter to the former." 53 The history of the phonautograph shows the smooth transitions from physiology to technology, and from technology to physiology. But these transitions were not merely a matter of terms, concepts, and metaphors: in physiological laboratories of the midnineteenth century, "artificial products" were connected on the level of material practices to the organs of the human body, even if these products would eventually break with their organic models. Organs were giving way to tools or instruments, tools were leading back to organs. This was not a circular movement, however: the organs in question were not necessarily the same, and they could be located in Schmidgen / The Donders Machine 237 different kinds of bodies. In the given case, the organ in question was the ear, while the body started out as a human one, to become eventually the body of a dog. But in the context of machine construction, this is only a side aspect. The coupling of the really distinct parts always happened beyond or beneath the large entities of "organism" on the one side and "mechanism" on the other. The initial model for the phonautograph was provided by the human ear. As an homme des lettres in a rather straightforward sense of the word, the inventor of the phonautograph, Édouard Léon Scott de Martinville, adopted a specific method to learn about the necessary details from anatomy and physiology. First as a typesetter, then as a proofreader, but also as an author interested, from an ouvrier's perspective, in novels, essay writing, and the history of stenography, Scott taught himself exclusively by means of printed matter. 54 In the 1840s he was working as a proofreader for the publishing house Mallet-Bachelier, which issued, among other publications, the Comptes rendus des séances hebdomadaires de l'Académie des Sciences. In the early 1850s, he changed to the Parisian print office L. Martinet. Apparently, it was during the proofreading of the two volumes of François Longet's Traité de physiologie that Scott conceived the initial idea for his invention. Longet's textbook contained a literal description of the human ear; not a single figure interrupted the text. 55 For Scott, as for all future readers of the Traité, the "mechanism of hearing" was presented in a series of short paragraphs provided with headings in italics: auricle, auditory canal, tympanum, ossicles, eustachian tube, inner ear, atrium, half-circular canals, and cochlea. Scott was interested only in the first half of these elements; his aim was the construction of a device for graphically recording sounds, not the simulation of the hearing process in its entirety. Given Scott's familiarity with writing and print, it is hardly surprising that the mode according to which he presented his invention to the Parisian public was that of grammatophily. When he showed his first phonautographical curves, he did make reference to the human ear as a model created "by a sublime artist," but he left no doubt that his main interest lay in developing some "perfect graphical art"-namely, the invention of a "writing of sound [graphie du son] ." Fascinated by the recent progress made in graphical technologies, photography in particular, Scott explained the basic idea of his phonautograph: "Just as light does, sound also delivers a perma-nent image from a distance; the human voice writes itself on a sensitive layer, in the very language that belongs to acoustics." 56 The graphical recordings that he presented to the Société d'Encouragement and other learned societies were somewhat disappointing, however-at least from his point of view. Scott's ultimate goal was to transform "the traces of words into a succession of signs by mechanical means." 57 Apparently, he thought of signs that were legible, or at least decipherable, by human beings. But instead of a readable synthesis, the traces he obtained with his newly constructed device showed only single aspects of human speech, such as pitch, volume, and timbre. The phonautograph did make speech visible on plates that had been covered with a "half-fluid layer," and Scott did not hesitate to call these plates "negatives" and compare them to daguerreotypes; but much to his regret these plates did not record "a stenography of speech that was immediately to be translated."
58 The "bad sounds [mauvais sons]" of the voice, its "hidden tones [sons voilés]," were also recorded, without being turned into readable signs. As has already been pointed out, physiologists were able to read Scott's phonautographical traces in a completely different way. The very fact that the sound self-writer did not translate human speech into readable letters, but rather analyzed recorded utterances with respect to various aspects of human speech, turned the phonautograph into an attractive device for scientific use. But only in 1857, when Scott started his cooperation with the instrument maker Koenig, was the phonautograph promoted to the ranks of a laboratory instrument.
Koenig's main contribution to reshaping the phonautograph consisted in breaking with its natural model. Thus, he fused into a single funnel what in Scott's device had been separated as the "auricle" and the "auditory canal." Scott had fixed the "tympanum" to the "auditory canal" with an inclination of between 30 and 45 degreesjust as Longet had described it, in his textbook, with respect to the human ear. In contrast, Koenig put the membrane straight onto the tip of the funnel. Moreover, he extended the spectrum of signs that were recorded with the phonautograph. Scott speculated that his device might lead to acquiring knowledge about the sound properties of all solid bodies, properties that, as he reasoned, stood in close relationship to the "inner texture" of these bodies; potentially, the phonautograph was "a means to write the molecular movements in different kinds of wood, metal, and amalgamation." 59 But despite his theoretical interest in such asemiotic encodings, Scott restricted himself practically to registering signifying semiologies: vocals, and above all, speech. In other words, he did perceive signs in their connection to materiality, but at the same time he subjected them to the sphere of human communication. His notion of writing was a quite restricted one. In contrast, Koenig's understanding of the phonautograph was not limited to seeing it as a "speech-writing machine": 60 the apt mechanic saw it as a general semiotic tool for scientific purposes. He therefore integrated, as a stable component, a tuning fork into the device. Since the number of vibrations the fork made per second was known, those vibrations could be used to draw an additional curve onto the rotating drum, allowing other recordings to be measured with respect to their duration. In this context, Koenig referred to the physicist Guillaume Wertheim and his research on the elasticity of various metals: according to Koenig, Wertheim was the first experimenter who had used tuning forks for the purpose of exact time determinations.
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While Koenig was promoting the phonautograph as a scientific sign and measurement tool in his catalogs, the ear still haunted Scott. After he had broken with Koenig (for unknown reasons), he aimed at reinforcing the similarities between his device and the human auditory organ. His new version of the phonautograph contained two membranes connected by a system of ivory pieces modeled on the ossicles of the human ear. The studies of Félix Savart and Johannes Müller on the mechanical imitation of natural auditory organs (see Fig. 6 ) served as Scott's reference point. 62 But a readable trace never emerged.
And Koenig? The instrument maker had irrevocably broken with the human ear as a model for his sound self-writer. Despite this fact, the phonautograph brought him back to the physiology of hearing. Together with the physiologist and future ear specialist Adam Politzer, Koenig conducted a series of rather cruel experiments with prepared ears of dogs in the summer of 1861. Politzer was responsible for the anatomic preparations; Koenig's task was limited to the problem of "inscription." On the back of an ear separated from the dog's body, a stylus was glued to the lower part of the stirrup or the hammer. In front of the ear, an organ pipe was used for sound production. The resulting vibrations of the ear were recorded on a kymograph drum. Politzer, in his later years, pursued this kind of reSchmidgen / The Donders Machine 241 search under Carl Ludwig's direction in Vienna, whereas Koenig presented tracés produced by the vibrations of dog ossicles only once, at the London World's Fair in 1862-side by side with the "sound writings" he had produced by means of the phonautograph. 63 With respect to inscription, natural and artificial ears thus came quite close to one another.
In the middle of this material coming and going between organ and instrument, body and technology, the phonautograph was stabilized as an assemblage of organic and mechanical parts. How critical the combination of natural and artificial components was for its functioning becomes clear from a letter Koenig wrote in the late 1850s, when delivering one of his devices to Donders in Utrecht, in which he gave some recommendations as to the material of the "styluses" that should be used: If one wanted to record the form of vibrations, a "stylus made out of thin copper slightly sprung" was the best choice; 64 accordingly, it was a "sharpened and elastic chip from a coil bent into the vertical plane" that Donders used in his investigations on the physiology of speech, in order to record the shapes of vowels and consonants. 65 When using the phonautograph for measuring physiological time, however, the main issue was not the quality or shape of the vibrations, but their quantity; as Koenig explained, in this case "the most convenient pencil seems to be a little swan feather fixed on a piece of wild boar bristle." 66 The bristle was meant to be fixed to the membrane, which usually consisted of a piece of animal bladder or appendix, or was sometimes made of thin paper. 67 As a whole the phonautograph presented itself as a rudimentary artificial ear in which the function of the tympanum was fulfilled by organic bladders or appendices, and the function of the ossicles was taken over by animal bristles and feathers. In the core of the Donders machine, it was thus the encounter of an organic membrane and stylus and a tuning fork on a rotating drum that formed the precondition for graphically measuring time.
The Periphery
The periphery of the Donders machine connected the Utrecht physiology laboratory with the private apartments of its director. The workbench of the experimenter moved close to the desk of the scientific author, and the sooted paper that covered the drum of the phonautograph found itself literally side by side with the eventually published texts. But even within this vicinity, the coupling of the "really distinct parts" occurred by means of a system of interrupted flows. Just as the air stream coming out of the lungs of experimenter and experimental subject had to be interrupted in order to be registered in a precisely timed manner, so the stream of Donders's handwriting had to be broken and cut-this time, to transmute from traces to texts. Again, this was not a one-sided affair. The periphery had technological as well as organic, and professional as well as private, aspects. As the installation in the laboratory further developed into a special device, the "noematachograph" (i.e., speed-of-thought writer), it tended to become ever more powerful. Simultaneously, the time budget of the physiologist was narrowed down. As a consequence, the multiplicity of stimuli and reactions that the new, modified installation was able to produce and record was increasingly difficult to handle.
In order to process the curves he had generated in his experiments, Donders relied on tables, forms, and notebooks. To evaluate his time experiments, he proceeded in the following way:
At the end of the experiment, the paper was cut along a line approximately corresponding to the start and the end of all rotations, so that on the oblong sheet each continuous tuning-fork curve corresponds to one trial. The trials are then numbered, and to each trial any comments are provided that are considered necessary before the smut is fixed with alcohol containing varnish. 68 Donders took the paper off the drum of the phonautograph, cut it into strips, and brought these strips onto an even plane where they were fixed. Then he took loose sheets of lined paper that he had turned into table-like forms, by first folding them twice lengthwise and then unfolding them again. On the upper part of these sheets he noted the names of experimental subject and experimenter, the number of tuning-fork vibrations per second, the date, and the kind of experiment that was conducted (e.g., "repeating a known syllable"). In the left column, he wrote the number of the respective trial on the fixed kymograph strip. In the next column, he noted the kind of stimulus given and the required reaction (e.g., "ki," "ki"). In the other columns, he recorded the number of tuning-fork vibrations that he had counted between stimulus and reaction. In addition, he calculated averages and made short comments on the course of single experiments-for example, with respect to a given reaction, "too late" or "too early," or sometimes, apparently referring to the original traces, "lost" (see Fig. 7 ). The use of loose sheets facilitated comparisons between the various series of experiments. At the same time, it instituted a serial, quasi-temporal order: new results could always be added in the same form-line by line, page by page. If Donders's experiments concerned extremely short times, this paper technology did not restrict him from conducting ever more experiments over time.
On the basis of these data sheets, the Utrecht physiologist began to sketch out text modules. He summarized the results of his own investigations and compared them with the published results of other investigations. In addition, he wrote down comments, and noted insights and reflections. For this purpose he used a notebook with a solid binding, containing lined paper in the same format as the data sheets. On the cover of this book he wrote "The Speed of Activities in the Nervous System"; in the back he kept the growing collection of his data sheets. 69 As with the sheets, the prepared division of the book's writing space played an important role. Obviously, the stream of writing was not meant to flood the pages, but to be channeled into precisely circumscribed cases. Donders numbered all the pages of his book and assigned to specific pages, in a loose order, the topics or sections of the monograph he apparently aimed to write, topics such as, "Physiological Time," "Wundt's Experiments," or "Individual Differences." More functional parts were identified as "Introduction," "Methods," or "Literature." He listed these headings and the corresponding page numbers in a "Table of Contents" at the end of the book (where he also kept his data sheets). Donders filled the prepared pages in his notebook based on the progress he made in his experiments and in the processing of other publications: where he progressed rapidly, he wrote complete paragraphs; other pages were left empty. Thus, the ongoing writing labor in the book adapted itself flexibly to the progress of noting results on sheets of paper, and to the sign production in the laboratory (see Fig. 8 ).
Based on the text modules collected in his notebook, Donders eventually set out to compose a coherent text. In the Utrecht archives one of his manuscripts has survived that obviously refers to the data sheets and the text modules in the notebook; its title is "In- vestigations of the Duration of Psychological Processes." Based on its content, this may be a first sketch of Donders's article "On the Speed of Psychological Processes," or perhaps it was even meant as preparation for the book-length study that was never completed. The sheets of paper on which Donders wrote here were not lined, but despite this fact, there is no continuous course of handwriting: corrections, crossings-out, and insertions-sometimes of single words, sometimes of entire pages-interrupt the stream of the writing and testify to multiple layers or strata of work, of reading and writing, rereading and rewriting. Thus, not only does the content of this manuscript deal with time, that is, physiological time, but its specific form, its graphie (see Fig. 9 ), is also concerned with time-writing time, which is wiped out in the published article, transformed into the clean and solid body of a printed text.
Explicitly as well as implicitly Donders's texts thus speak about time: physiological time, and the time of writing. In addition, they repeatedly address the time of the physiologist. This becomes evident first in references to the past and future. In his notebook "The Speed of Activities in the Nervous System" Donders notes, for example, with respect to the investigations that he and others had conducted thus far: "There is a lot that remains to be done." 70 In contrast, he writes in his published article that, before starting the investigations with de Jaager, he had been interested "for a long time already" in the question of the speed of psychological processes. A flashback to the experiments undertaken in 1865 makes explicit the time of the physiologist:
Meanwhile, as the research continued the experimental results accumulated to such an extent that I lacked the time to handle them properly, and as the prospect of my being able to do so is still not favorable, I have decided to publish the main parts for the time being in a condensed form. 71 In a similar way, Donders speaks (in his notebook) of the "manifold" experiments and their "large extent." 72 The semiotic productivity of his laboratory machine apparently conflicted with Donders's ambition carefully to evaluate the results and conduct further, more specific experiments. One answer to this conflict was to choose a specific form or genre of publication-the journal article-and to focus, through this form, on the "main parts" of the results. Interestingly enough, in his manuscript Donders mentions that a series of journal articles is in preparation: If the plural "journal articles" is not referring to the fact that Donders published versions of his 1868 article in Dutch, French, and German, it directs our attention directly to the title of the German article: in its complete form, this title reads "Die Schnelligkeit psychischer Processe: Erster Artikel," that is, "The Speed of Psychological Processes: First Article." The subtitle, in particular, deserves some reflection. On the one hand, Donders had already published on the same matter: three years earlier, the first volume of the Nederlandsch Archief voor Genees-en Natuurkunde contained a "Preliminary Communication" by Donders concerning the experiments carried out with de Jaager; 74 in the light of this publication, "Erster Artikel" can only mean "First Article." On the other hand, a second article was never published: the "First Article" was also Donders's last on the topic. The reasons for this are at least partially to be found in the technological improvements of the Donders machine. During the three years between the beginning of the investigations conducted together with de Jaager and the publication of Donders's "First Article," the earlier installations with kymograph and phonautograph contracted into a more powerful device: the "noematachograph."
In October 1866, Donders presented this new version of his machine to the Dutch public (see Fig. 10 ). Its technological main component, constructed in cooperation with the Utrecht laboratory mechanic, Dirk B. Kagenaar, united the advantages of the two earlier research installations. In addition to verbal utterances, induction shocks, and sparks, sounds, such as those resulting from hitting a tuning fork or dropping a metal bolt, could also be used as stimuli. For the reactions, one could use either an electric switch operated by hand (the use of which Donders did not recommend, "because of the variable delay"), the production of speech sounds, the operation of some sort of mechanical switch recording its marks directly on the rotating drum, or the hitting of a tuning fork. Funnel and membrane were replaced by a "simpler" arrangement based on a stethoscope by Koenig. A membrane was still used to record the vibrations on the drum, and the time marker remained a tuning fork that recorded its vibrations beside the stimulus and reaction curves. 75 Further modifications concerned the breadth of the rotating drum and the duration of tuning-fork vibrations (the latter could be significantly extended by means of an electromagnet).
Taken together, these changes made it possible to conduct much more comprehensive series of trials than before. Electric contacts at the tuning fork and the drum even made it possible to produce induction sparks going from the fork through the paper to the drum. Thus, the sooted paper recorded more than just continuous vibrations of the tuning fork: the sparks allowed specific events (stimuli or reactions) to be marked as small points directly on the curve (see Fig. 11 ). Without a doubt, the "noematachograph" measured time with increased precision and "accumulated" ever more experimental results; it allowed for a richer variation of stimuli and reactions, and the carrying out of long series of trials. The obtained traces, however, Figure 10 . Noematachograph made by Kagenaar as it is preserved in the Utrecht University Museum. In comparison with the phonautograph, this element of the Donders machine allowed more diverse stimuli to be presented and an appropriate range of reactions to be recorded. In addition to acoustical stimuli, optical and tactile stimuli could be used. At the upper end of the wooden frame a tuning fork, hooked on a glass tube, hangs down. This fork and the rotating drum could be connected to electric current (see the contact isolated by means of glass in front at the right). In addition, the larger size of the drum made it possible to record more extended series of experiments. (From the photograph collection of the Utrecht University Museum, with kind permission.) still had to be processed manually: their transfer into tables, the transposition of these tables into notes, and the transformation of these notes into spelled-out texts could obviously not be improved in a comparable manner. In the summer and winter of 1872, Donders did conduct some series of experiments with the new device: a new notebook was started, and some pages were filled with results and notes-but this was not sufficient for another publication. In 1878, Kagenaar presented the noematachograph once again at an instrument exhibit in London. 76 No further publications, however, either from the Utrecht laboratory or from any other research institution, were issued that testify to the use of this version of the machine. Donders's 1868 article is the first and definitively the last publication connected concretely with the use of the speed-ofthought writer.
The exact reason why Donders lacked the time to handle his proliferating results "properly" is, and probably will remain, unclear. Ironically, the machine physiologist himself referred to family reasons in a letter to Helmholtz pressing immediately one believes to find the time every following day, and then again the day goes bankrupt, with a time bill for the following one. By the way, we have gone through much, with time.
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The time that Donders directly addresses here is the time of the family. "We" refers to himself and his wife Ernestina as well as to their daughter Marie and her fiancé, the physiologist Theodor Engelmann, who started to work in the Utrecht laboratory in 1867. Donders tells Helmholtz about the short joy of the young couple and all the following sorrows: first Marie Donders fell ill, then Engelmann. In Donders's letter, time has come so much to the fore that it appears to act as some sort of authentic subject: "By the way, we have gone through much, with time." Even the mood of "we" is described by Donders in temporal terms: "But we are grateful that the future is looking friendly upon us, and thus we enjoy already what is present." 78 At this point, scientific and personal writing meet each other, and it hardly seems accidental that the encounter takes place in the context of a genre that is even more bound to time than a journal article. Still, this letter belongs to the periphery of the Donders machine. It contains a remote echo of the experiments with the phonautograph, perhaps unnoticed by Donders himself. In quasieconomical terms the letter addresses the succession of single days and the displacements taking place between succeeding days: bankruptcy has to be announced, bills are issued. Taken alone, every single day appears to be long; in their succession, however, they tend to seem short. No different were the results of the time-measuring experiments with vowels conducted by Donders in 1864: The Dutch word for day, daag, takes more time to pronounce than its plural form, dagen; the difference is five tuning-fork vibrations per second.
Conclusion
The history of in physiological and psychological experimentation is a history of experimentation machines-of installations that connect a vast number of heterogeneous components. The coupling of these elements is not just a question of space but also, and perhaps above all, a matter of time. An experiment is not a stable collection or a "thing" in the etymological sense of the word, but a dynamic cooperation, a time-based assemblage involving the "together with" and "against each other" of artificial and natural organs as well as the sophisticated use of organic and nonorganic writing sur-faces and styli. The case of the Donders machine shows that there is no radical difference between the materiality and the semiology of such cooperations. The transitory connection of "really distinct" parts transforms these parts into agencies of semiotic activity, even if not all products of this activity are recorded, fixed, and published. Of the shouted syllables by means of which, in the Utrecht laboratory, experimenter, experimental subject, and phonautograph connected with each other, there remain only the reproduction of a single curve in Donders's published article and the handwritten pairs of letters on his data sheets. The tone of the time-marking tuning fork has also long vanished; what is left is a handful of original tracés, half-forgotten and stocked in some archive. Highlighting (as has been done here) the actual multiplicity of signs produced in the laboratory can result in some sort of overspecialized philology-but it does not have to. What is necessary, eventually, is to retrace the internal couplings of machines in their materiality, and vice versa, thereby exploring rich semiologies that barely survive in scientific publications. Most importantly, the materiality and the semiotics of laboratory machines refer us back to the dimension of time. Interruptions of flows of all sorts (mechanical, organic, energetic, semiotic, etc.) are central for turning the raw matter of such machines into semiotic stuff.
To speak about "machines" in this context aims first at grasping and describing the precarious but functioning assemblages by means of which and through which epistemic effects are produced in laboratories. This level of description is abandoned, however, when the question arises, in a second step, of getting at the core of these assemblages. This analysis aims at isolating "the really distinct parts" within a machine that are "bound together by the absence of any tie." 79 In the Donders machine there is indeed no natural, logical, or signifying connection between wild boar bristle, swan feather, tuning fork, and brass drum; combined according to principles of precise time experiments, these elements show in an exemplary manner the "together with" and "against each other" of the natural and the artificial that is highly characteristic of experiments in the biological sciences. The extent to which other such machines (e.g., the Helmholtz or the Wundt machine) can be retraced to their respective cores in a similar manner, shall be examined in further studies. In the framework of the present article, it was sufficient to offer an exemplary case and to name some of the elements that, in the words of Gilbert Simondon, serve as "seeds" to propagate machines: it was not Donders's noematachograph (as a whole), but rather the tuning fork (as a partial object) that became a standard component of physiological experiments focusing on precise time measurements in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s. 80 The opening of the machine with respect to its core corresponds to its unfolding with respect to its periphery. The Donders machine connected laboratory benches and writing desks, data sheets and publications, even professional and private aspects of life. Donders's exchange with distant instrument makers and his cooperation with laboratory mechanics resulted in changes concerning the technological aspects of his machine. What initially materialized in various loose installations contracted eventually into a comparatively closed technological object, the noematachograph. Simultaneously, Donders's scientific demands increased with respect to the functioning of the machine and its outcome. The translation of presignifying semiologies fixed on sooted paper into signifying semiologies as they reign in notebooks and publications required a considerable amount of attention and care on behalf of the physiologist-above all, time "to handle" the results "properly." In the Utrecht laboratory, the answer to this challenge was not found in changing the organization of the laboratory, whether because of a lack of financial resources or a lack of interest in an extended research program. Apparently, it was sufficient for Donders to have demonstrated the functioning of his machine in an exemplary manner; everything else crystallized as a disproportion between the increased possibilities of technologybased sign production in the laboratory and his capacities for manual sign production at the desk. Donders published only one article on the question of physiological time.
The Donders machine organized a scheme, it drew a diagram. As has been pointed out, the use of time measurements for conducting analytic experiments was not limited to the Utrecht context. In Königsberg, Helmholtz proceeded in the same manner in his investigations on the propagation speed of nervous excitation. In Neuchâtel, Hirsch adopted similar principles, and-after Donders-Wilhelm Wundt in Leipzig as well as Sigmund Exner in Heidelberg proceeded in like ways: first, practically deterritorializing the body, transforming it by means of experiment into a surface; and second, theoretically engaging in its reterritorialization by means of anatomical and physiological concepts. Even today, experimental psycholo-gists and cognitive scientists apply this scheme-but it was the Donders machine that opened the span between stimulus and reaction in such highly consequential ways. Obviously, the epistemology of this machine was devoted to an ideal of analytical completeness. Once opened, the span between S and R was hastily filled with anatomical, physiological, and psychological elements until no aspect of the reaction process was left undetermined. But in the following years and decades, this opening, once circumscribed, became one of the decisive sites for negotiating scientific and philosophical discourses. In the 1890s, Henri Bergson, for example, insisted on the "latitude," the indeterminacy, the uncertainty implied in the distance between stimulus and reaction, in order to develop-as Deleuze has shown-an innovative and highly provocative theory of the image.
Perhaps one can therefore say that the Donders machine, despite its orientation toward analytical completeness, instantiated in the acoustic realm what the cinema would later materialize in the optical. Through a system of vibrations, inscriptions, and transmissions it spread an "experimental night" (Deleuze), a white space over us. 81 It created and cultivated a territory "completely of its own" (Donders) and triggered at the same time the becoming of a body, an "unknown body" (Deleuze) . The Donders machine is thus more and less than a machine in the common sense of the term: Not a simple instrument, but a transversal coupling of body and technology, of human beings, technological objects, and recording surfaces. Not just an embodiment of a powerful and comprehensive "discourse network," but an experimental arcade leading from the presignifying to the signifying. The Donders machine is a machine in the sense of Deleuze and Guattari. It is a sign machine, a time machine.
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